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After major banking crisis, investors and academics alike are left won-
dering how it could have been avoided. Crises can take an enormous toll
on society. Mexico's 1994 crisis cost almost 10% of GDP. Chile's 1983 crisis
was even worse, with the ¯nal cost amounting to a stunning 30% of GDP.
Moreover, the economy can experience a traumatic recovery process that in
some cases lasts several years. The most common explanation of banking
crises focuses on the anticipation of government bail out. This mechanism
takes place when investors expect that the government will help them cover
their losses in case they face a generalized adverse shock.
The paper shows how an insurance scheme eliminates the externality
generated by the above government bail out policy. As an example, the
paper analyzes the case of liquidity risk, de¯ned as an unexpected cash
withdrawal, and it presents a scheme to deal with this risk. This scheme
works as an insurance where each bank pays a premium depending on the
bank's risk. The scheme used in Argentina where the Central Bank charges
to each bank a premium to insurance their liquidity risk, for an insurance
which the Central Bank acquires in the international markets is an empirical
example.
In addition, a new procedure is developed to estimate the social cost of
a bank crisis which is di®erent from the net transfer from the government
to the banking sector and independent of the existence of the crisis.
11 Introduction
After a banking crisis, a question that arises among investors and academics
is, could it have been avoided? First, right after a banking crisis, the gov-
ernment needs an enormous amount of resources to avoid a generalized
bankruptcy. As an example, the Mexican crisis in 1994 cost almost 10%
of GDP, while Chile's government during the 1983 banking crisis needed
around 30% of GDP.
Note that the costs mentioned above are the net transfers from the gov-
ernment to the ¯nancial sector at the time of the crisis. In addition to this
government transfer, the economy is typically involved in a traumatic re-
covery process, that could even last several years. The painfulness of this
recovery process is due not only to the government policies to raise resources
in order to overcome the crisis (i.e. tax increase, in°ation or some other cre-
ative policies), but also to the economy's restructuring (i.e. ¯nancial system
reorganization and other resource allocation). Therefore, the estimation of
the total cost should include more than the net transfer from the government
to the ¯nancial system.
Besides the cost generated by a ¯nancial crisis, the ¯nancial system has
particular characteristics. As shown by Edwards and Vegh (1996), it can
transmit a shock generated in one economic sector to the whole economy in
as h o r tp e r i o d .
Among the generating mechanisms of ¯nancial crises, the anticipated
ex-post government bail out policy emerges as a competitive explanation. A
bail out is when investors know that in case of a generalized negative shock,
the government will help them pay for the losses.
This paper will show how an insurance scheme can eliminate bank crises
generated by a government bail out. Using the result from the insurance
scheme setting, the model presents an optimal policy to deal with liquidity
risk used by a lender of last resort. In addition, the paper will show a new
procedure to measure the welfare cost of a government bail out policy which
is independent to the existence of ¯nancial crises.
Concerning this government intervention policy in recent episodes, Krug-
man (1998) pointed out that the implicit government guarantee to ¯nancial
intermediaries was responsible for the South Korean crisis in 1997. Accord-
ing to Krugman, ¯nancial intermediaries knew that the government would
help them in case of a crisis. Hence, they did not consider, in their in-
vestment decision, a negative shock as a possible outcome. In addition, he
mentioned that this implicit subsidy could generate a social cost. With re-
spect to the social cost, this paper develops an alternative methodology to
2measure it.
To formalize the bank's problem, the paper borrows from Freixas and
Rochet (1997) a risk classi¯cation for ¯nancial institutions, where the bank's
uncertainty can divided in three types: a) Default risk, when borrowers are
not able to repay the debt; b) Liquidity risk, banks must make unexpected
cash payment such as deposit withdrawal or pay back loans; and, c) Market
risk, when some external shock a®ects the portfolio of marketable assets of
the bank. Taking this classi¯cation into account, the paper analyzes only
the second case, when banks have to honor their liabilities in a short period.
The reason to model only liquidity risk is that introducing other types of
risk will not make a signi¯cant contribution to the analysis.
During a banking crisis, though an economy faces countless problems,
one of the most remarkable is a liquidity constraint. Moreover, from time
to time this liquidity constraint can drive the country into a generalized
crisis. For example, after the Mexican Crisis in December of 1994, the ¯-
nancial system in Argentina faced a strong liquidity constraint that almost
brought down the stabilization plan implemented in March of 1991. If the
Argentinean Central Bank had not reduced banks' reserve requirements to
inject liquidity into the system, plus the support program by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the resolution of the crisis could have been totally
di®erent. This liquidity risk might not be the cause of a banking crisis itself,
but without doubt it plays a signi¯cant role during the crisis. The paper
will use this risk to introduce the government bail out policy.
The ¯rst part of the paper analyzes the e®ect of the asset liquidity de-
gree on the bank's pro¯t maximization problem. In other words, how the
liquidity degree of assets a®ects the bank's investment decision. The liq-
uidity problem is formulated as follows. After a bank receives deposits, it
has to decide whether to invest in loans or government bonds. At the time
of the investment decision, the bank knows that with certain probability
d e p o s i t o r sw i l lw i t h d r a wt h e i rd e p o s i t sa tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .I nc a s eo fa
bank run, the bank can sell its bond holdings in the market at face value to
honor depositors. If the bank does not have enough bond holdings to honor
depositors, it will need to sell loans in the market at a discount, generating
a loss.
The natural question at this stage should be, why would a bank be
willing to provide loans if it could generate a loss in case of a bank run? The
reason is that the loan interest rate is higher than the return on government
bonds.1 Driven by this trade-o® between risk and return, banks should
1This assumption will be shown explicitly later.
3¯nd an optimum relation between loans and government bonds. So far,
there is nothing new because a bank, as any other ¯rm in the economy, has
revenues and costs from its transactions. So, these ¯nancial institutions can
determine the optimum holding of assets from this trade-o® between costs
and revenues. The problem arises when there is an expected government
guarantee on bank operations. In this case, the bank would not consider the
assets discounted price as a loss in the maximization process, because the
bank knows that the government will pay for it.
With respect to the alternative ways liquidity was modeled in the liter-
ature, the following methodologies come to mind: A) Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) motivated one direction of research, where the basic model assumes
two periods and two assets. In addition, the authors assume that the long
run asset has a higher return than the short run asset and banks do not
know if they will face a run at the end of the ¯rst period. Now, suppose
banks face a run at the end of the ¯rst period. If banks do not have enough
liquid assets to honor depositors, they will need to sell long run assets at a
discounted price generating a capital loss.
In the Diamond and Dybvig (D&D) model, any mechanism that can
stop the run in the ¯rst period increases the wealth of the economy. The
increase in wealth is explained by holding higher return (long run) assets.
A di®erence between D&D and the model presented in this paper is that
D&D did not introduce a probability distribution for the bank run; they
assume that the run is generated by a change in investor's expectations. On
the other hand, the model presented in this paper introduces a probability
distribution for the bank run. The justi¯cation for introducing a probability
distribution for the bank run is grounded in the following example. Suppose
that an investor has a CD in an emerging market. When US interest rates
rise, the investor would like to withdraw the money from the emerging mar-
ket to invest it in US ¯nancial market. Thus, the probability distribution
of the bank run would come from the probability distribution of the US
interest rate.
B) Ad-Hoc liquidity cost. This methodology introduces an ad-hoc cost
for being illiquid in the bank pro¯t function. In this case, the illiquidity
cost is determined by the amount of the liquidity shortage times a pre-
determined punitive interest rate. The optimal bank liquidity position is
found by maximizing the pro¯t function. In this ad-hoc model, the punitive
interest rate is pre-determined. In contrast, the model presented in this
paper endogenizes the liquidity risk. In other words, the market interest
rate is determined by the liquidity risk position taken by the bank.
C) Banks as Market makers. Following the idea of a broker role in the ex-
4change market, where the bid-ask prices are derived from the broker's pro¯t
maximization problem, this methodology derives the interest rate spread
from the bank's pro¯t maximization problem.2
Summarizing, the model developed in this paper is a combination of
both, the Diamond and Dybvig structure and of banks as market makers.
It is a one period, two assets model. Banks do not know if they will face
a run at the end of the period, but they know the probability distribution
of a bank run. In the case that banks face a run, and they do not have
enough liquid assets, they will need to sell illiquid assets at a discount to
honor depositors.
The model presents several attractive characteristics. First, despite its
simplicity, it is °exible enough to simulate the e®ects on the economy of a
wide variety of shocks.
Second, it models government bail out. The paper studies a regime
where banks know that in case of a generalized crisis, the government will
help them to avoid a generalized bankruptcy in the banking system. In
addition, the behavior of the loan and deposit interest rates and of the
spread between them is analyzed. On the other hand, the paper develops an
insurance scheme to eliminate the externality generated by the government
bail out policy.
Third, the paper derives a new procedure to estimate the social cost of
the government intervention. Where the social cost is independent of the
existence of a crisis and generated by a misallocation of resources.
In section II, the model is derived. Section III analyzes the comparative
statics. This section shows how the equilibrium reacts to: a capital in°ow,
an increase in the probability of bank run, an increase of the asset liquid-
i t yd e g r e e ,a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ep o w e ro ft h er u n . S e c t i o nI Ve x a m i n e s
the welfare cost of a government intervention and shows how an insurance
scheme could eliminate the government externality, in addition, this sec-
tion presents the optimal intervention of a lender of last resort. Section V
concludes.
2In the model presented in the paper, spread should be interpreted as the di®erence
between loan interest rate and the deposit interest. And the asset characteristic considered
would be the asset liquidity degree.
52 Section II
2.1 Agents in the economy
The model includes the following participants: the Central Bank, a private
bank, and a collection agency. For the sake of clarity, this paper abstracts
from the problem of production and consumption by assuming an ad-hoc
demand for loans and an ad-hoc supply of deposits to complete the deposit
and loan market.
In this economy, the Central Bank imposes a reserve requirement on
private banks, sets the exchange rate devaluation and acts as an insurance
company. The private bank receives deposits, and uses its net worth plus the
di®erence between deposits and reserve requirements to invest in government
bonds, and loans to ¯rms.
The collection agency buys ¯nancial assets sold by banks and recovers
the face value of these assets after paying a cost associated to the liquidity
level of the asset.
The model assumes a small open economy integrated with the rest of
the world. This, together with a predetermined exchange rate, implies that
the nominal interest rate is the real interest rate plus the devaluation rate
(i = r + ²).
2.2 Bank Pro¯t Maximization Problem
The banking literature typically refers to the mismatching problem as the
di®erence in timing between assets and liabilities. Instead, this paper will
focus on the mismatch of the liquidity levels of assets and liabilities. The
reason for this is the fact that the disparity in liquidity levels and not the
time structure determines the capital loss when an asset is sold immediately.
For example, there should be no problem in investing in a 30 year US T-bill
if banks, at the time they need cash, could go to the market, and sell it
without a capital loss.
This liquidity mismatch is crucial in the case of bank run, because the
liquidity shortage can generate a huge loss. This possible cost raises the
following question: Why would banks prefer to invest in illiquid assets if
this can create a loss in the case of bank run?
As a possible answer, Mendelson and Amihud(1986) showed that asset
return is an increasing and concave function of the asset liquidity degree. In
other words, when the asset liquidity degree is decreasing, the asset return
is increasing but at a lower rate. Therefore, banks can increase their pro¯t
6by holding more illiquid assets3.
What happens if depositors want their money back? If banks do not
have enough liquid assets to honor depositors, they need to sell other assets
to obtain resources. Selling illiquid assets will generate a huge cost. And
sometimes, this loss can produce the bankruptcy of the institution.
Note that given the trade-o® between the gain from a higher interest rate
and the cost of liquidation, banks should ¯nd an optimum liquidity ratio.
Using this trade-o®, banks should determine the optimal composition of the
bank's portfolio in government bonds, loans, and reserve requirements.
The investment opportunities are speci¯ed in equation (1), which is the
bank balance sheet.
a = h + b + z ¡ d (1)
Here, a is net assets, b government bonds, h reserve requirements, z
loans, and d deposits. The paper assumes that the Central Bank imposes a
reserve requirement h = ±d:
The investment opportunities faced by the bank are loans (z)a n dg o v -
ernment bonds (b). The asset characteristics are summarized in its rate of
return, and the only di®erence between the investment opportunities (loan
and bonds) are their liquidity degree. The interest rate for z (less liquid
asset) is higher than the interest rate of government bond (liquid asset),
according to stylized facts in Mendelson and Amihud(1986).
The sequence of events in the model will help to clarify the problem
faced by banks.
At the beginning of period, banks receive deposits, invest in loans and
government bonds, and hold reserve requirements. At the end of the period,
banks discover whether or not they face a bank run.
In case of a bank run, if banks have enough liquid assets (government
bonds plus reserve requirements) to honor depositors, they will not need to
sell assets and no loss occurs. However, if they do not have enough liquid
resources, they have to sell their assets to honor depositors, which generates
a loss.
Banks's pro¯ts are given by
3Here, the model assumes that loans are the illiquid assets and government bonds and
deposits are the liquid assets and liquid liabilities respectively.









id Deposit interest rate.
iL Loan interest rate.
i Bond interest rate.
k = 1 indicates a bank run and k = 2 indicates no bank run.
P(w) Fire price of assets.
®k the percentage of deposits that banks have to honor in state of nature
k. Where ®2 =0 .
± is the percentage of reserve requirements.
q1 Probability of a bank run.
The ¯rst terms in brackets of equation (2) represents the bank opera-
tional revenue, which consists of: a) nominal interest rate earning on bank
n e tw o r t h ,b )T h el o a nr e t u r no v e rt h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s t( iL ¡ i)t i m e st h e
amount of loan, c) The nominal interest rate minus the deposit rate (i¡id)
times the amount of deposit, and d) The cost of the reserve requirement.
The second part of equation (2) analyzes the bank's uncertainty. This
uncertainty is a cost that will depend on the revealed state of nature, where
the state is determined by whether or not a bank run occurs.
In the case of a bank run, the bank should honor a percentage ® of the
deposit. If ®d > ±d + b, then, the bank would need to sell assets to honor
depositors. The amount of assets sold, (®kd¡±d¡b
P(w) ); times the loss per asset
sold, [1 ¡ P(w)]; is the total capital loss5. In the case of no bank run, or
®d < ±d + b, this cost is zero because banks do not need to sell assets.
At period zero banks do not know for sure the outcome at the end of
the period, but they know the expected value of the loss, which is the loss
in each state times the probability of that state of the nature.6
4This pro¯t function is expressed in nominal term to facilitate the derivation of the
solution. Given that " is constant, the solution of both, the nominal and the real pro¯t
function are the same.
5P(w) is price of the asset when banks need to sell it immediately. w is the amount
of resources, above the available liquid assets held by banks, needed to honor depositors.
The derivation of P(w)a n dw will be shown later.
6It is important to emphasize that, although a constant q is assumed, I do not believe
that this probability is invariable. Moreover, I think that understanding q further will
8Now, it is clear how the trade o® between assets works. From the ¯rst
part of the equation (2), an increase in loans, given a constant d, will increase
the bank's pro¯t, because the loan interest rate (iL) is higher than the bond
interest rate (i). Nevertheless, this reallocation can generate a capital loss
in case of bank run, because the di®erence ®d ¡ ±d ¡ b, will be higher. In
other words, banks will need to sell more assets to honor depositors.
Using the basic insurance literature and assuming that the bank is risk
n e u t r a l ,t h es e c o n dp a r to ft h ep r o ¯ tf u n c t i o nc a nb er e w r i t t e na st h ec o s t
of an insurance that covers possible capital losses. From the microeconomic
literature, it is a well-known result that a risk neutral individual is indi®erent
between playing a deterministic game or buying an insurance for the fair
price. Both problems give the same expected result.
The possible outcomes of the game are: no loss, if there is no bank run;
and a capital loss if there is a bank run. The equivalent insurance scheme
means that banks should pay a premium, and the insurance company will
pay the loss in case of a bank run. Introducing the insurance scheme in the
bank maximization problem will not change the result, but this procedure
will facilitate the mathematical exposition and the interpretation of the
results.
Plugging the insurance scheme in the bank problem, its pro¯t function
becomes
¼ =( 1+i)a +( iL ¡ i)z +( i ¡ id)d ¡ h ¡ J(w); (3)
where J(w) is the insurance premium paid by banks and w is the bank's
risk type. A lower w means a lower risk.
2.3 What is J(w)?
The model assumes that the Central Bank not only imposes a reserve re-
quirement (±), but also plays the role as an insurance company. As such,
the Central Bank will charge a premium to banks depending on their liq-
uidity position. In the event of a bank run, the Central Bank should pay for
the bank's capital loss. If the bank run does not occur, the Central Bank's
payment is zero because the loss does not occur.7
The risk level associated to a bank is determined in the following way.
help us to design better policies to manage this type of shocks.
7This insurance scheme works exactly as any typical insurance. Using as an example
the case of the car market insurance, the event of a car accident is equivalent, in this
paper, to a bank run. The insurance payment instead of being for ¯xing the car is for the
bank capital loss.





In case of a bank run, the bank has to honor the amount ®d of deposits.
Then, if ®d < ±d + b, the bank will have enough liquid resources to honor
depositors. However, if ®d > ±d + b, the bank should sell assets because its
liquid resources are not enough to honor depositors.
The risk level associated to a bank is the amount of resources over the
liquid asset holdings that it needs to honor depositors in case of a bank run.
De¯ne w as the amount of resources, above the available bank's liquid
assets, needed to honor deposits:
w ´ ®d ¡ ±d¡ b (4)
Adding and subtracting z in the ¯rst part of the equation, and plugging
the bank's balance sheet identity d = ±d+ b + z, w can be rewritten as,
w =( ® ¡ 1)d + z (5)







+1 ( 6 )
m measures the amount of resources needed per unit of loan to honor
depositors in the event of a bank run. Note that this variable depends on
the ratio of deposits and loans. Intuitively, when the ratio d
zdecreases, the
bank needs more resources per loan to avoid bankruptcy. This relationship
c a nb eo b s e r v e di ng r a p h1 .
The y-axis is a measure of the Central Bank's cost due to the run. As
we move closer to 0 in the x-axis, the cost is higher. If
d(®¡1)
z ·¡ 1t h ec o s t
would be 0 because the bank has enough liquid resources to cover the run
(it is the case when ®d < ±d + b). The higher m, the higher the Central
Bank cost, which should indicate a higher premium for the bank.
Formally, the insurance premium is obtained as a fair insurance. This fair





]wgq + J(w)(1 ¡ q)=0 ( 7 )
10where
[1¡P(w)]
P(w) w is the amount of the capital loss in a bank run.





Taking price P(w) as given, but replacing w by (5), the premium can














]q>0( 1 0 )
@J(w)
@d
=( ® ¡ 1)[
1 ¡ P(w)
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[(® ¡ 1)d + z]q
P(w)2 < 0( 1 3 )
According to equation (10), the premium increases when z increases.
The intuition is that an increase of bank loans increases the possible loss in
case of a bank run, therefore, the bank that takes a higher risk pays a higher
premium. From equation (11), the premium is lower when the amount of
deposit increases. The increase in deposits, given a determined amount of
loans, means that the bank's investment in liquid assets increases, and this
allows the bank to sell a smaller amount of assets in case of a bank run.
Equation (12) establishes that the premium is higher if the bank run is
stronger. From Equation (13), the premium is higher when the liquidation
price that the bank can get for the assets sold is lower.
Having de¯ned the term J(w),t h en e x ts t e pi st od e r i v et h e¯ r s to r d e r
condition of the bank's pro¯t maximization problem. Assuming a binding
reserve requirement, the ¯rst order conditions are9:
8Banks chose w, but take P(w) as given. Next section shows how this price is deter-
mined in the market.
9Remember that bank decides over z and d.








Note that the terms on the right hand side of (14) and (15) represent
the liquidity risk component of the maximization process.
2.4 How P(w) is determined
The liquidation price of the asset, as mentioned above, is determined en-
dogenously in the model. The equilibrium level of this price is one that
yields equal levels of supply and demand of w. The supply of w comes from
the banking system when it sells assets to raise cash, and the demand is
determined by the collection agency.
The collection agencies buy assets sold by banks and, after paying a
certain cost, these agencies can recover the full amount of the loan. Note
that the paper models only liquidity risk, and assumes no default risk.




]w ¡ C(w)( 1 6 )
Revenue is given by [
1¡P(w)
P(w) ]w. It means that these agencies recover the
face value of the loan, and pay P(w) for each asset bought. In addition,
they have to pay a cost of C(w) to recover the full amount of the loan.





>From this FOC, the demand of assets sold by banks is obtained.
The following two factors can be expected to a®ect the liquidation price
P(w): First, liquidity level: The lower the asset liquidity degree, the lower
the liquidation price. For example, the loss generated when a house is sold
immediately should be higher than the loss generated when government
bonds are sold at the same times. Second, the amount of assets to be sold:
the larger the amount of assets to be sold in the market, the lower the
liquidation price.
In particular, the cost function assumed is: C(w)=e¿w ¡ 1 for all
w>0a n d¿>0; where w represents the amount the assets traded in the
12market and ¿ the liquidity parameter. In this setting a higher ¿ means a
lower liquidity degree. For example, if the government bonds are totally
liquid, then ¿ = 0, and its price would always be 1. The paper uses this
cost function because it contains both characteristics speci¯ed above, and
facilitates the interpretation of the results.






The exogenous variables in the model are z;d;±;®;i;q;¿;".E v e nt h o u g hz
and d are assumed exogenous in this section, these variables will be endog-
enized in the welfare section where ad-hoc deposit supply and loan demand
are incorporated. This exogeneity assumption yields simpler expressions
without changing the results in qualitative terms.
The endogenous variables so far are P(w);i L;i d;J(w);w. The equilib-
rium can be found using the following ¯ve equations.
i) (® ¡ 1)d + z = w
w is derived for a given z;d; and ®.
ii) P(w)= 1
1+C0(w)
Plugging w and ¿ in the C0, the liquidity price is obtained





Then, for a given q and ® the value of the premium is determined
iv) iL ¡ i =
@J(w)
@z
v) i ¡ id = ±i+
@J(w)
@d
With i and the bank's ¯rst order conditions, the interest rates are de-
rived.
3 Comparative Statics
This section analyzes how the equilibrium changes when one of the pa-
rameters of the economy varies, speci¯cally for the cases of d;q;¿,a n d®.
Throughout this section the exogeneity of d = d0 and z = z0 is maintained.
The following table summarizes the results of this section.10
Summary of the Comparative Static
Table 1
10All the results are derived in the Appendix.
13P(w) w J(w) iL id iL ¡ id
Increase d * + + + + +
Increase q = = * * * *
Increase ¿ + = * * * *
Increase ® * * * * ? *
3.1 Case 1- Increase in d
Suppose deposits increase from d0 to d1: From (5), (® ¡ 1)d + z = w,a n d
(® ¡ 1) is less than zero, so this increase will reduce w.
Next, the liquidation price is obtained plugging the new value of w in
equation (17), P(w)= 1
1+C0(w). This increment in the price comes from the
r e d u c t i o ni nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t .





















T h es a m er e s u l tw o u l db eo b t a i n e di fi n s t e a do fa ni n c r e a s ei nd e p o s i t s ,
the banking system faced a reduction in loans. A graphical intuition of this
event was shown in graph 1, where the bank's risk type is given by a ratio
between deposits and loans. In this case, the increase in deposits improves
the liquidity position of the banking system.
Edwards and Vegh (1996) using a general equilibrium model, derived this
result, explaining the mechanism that generates the change in the deposit-
loan ratio. Here, the change is the ratio is exogenously given. However, a
contribution of this model with respect to Edwards and Vegh is that this
model gives a strong intuition of what could generate the cost function
assumed in their model, namely liquidity risk.
3.2 Case 2- Increase in q
Suppose that the probability of a bank run (q) increases. From (5), if ®, d
and z are constant, w should not change either. In other words, w would be
14constant, which according to equation (17), P(w)= 1
1+C0(w), would imply a
constant liquidity price P(w). It is clear from (8), J(w)=[
1¡P(w)
P(w) ]wq,t h a t
the insurance premium will increase.
The e®ect on the interest rate can be studied though the partial deriva-























Thus, the increase in the probability of a bank run will increase not only
the loan and deposit interest rate but also the spread between them.
An example of this event is the so-called "tequila e®ects ". After the
Mexican crisis in (1994), the probability of a bank run in Argentina could
have increased because investors believed that the Argentina economy could
face some problem too. As the model predicts, and the data showed, Ar-
gentina faced an increase in both the loan and deposit interest rates, and
the spread between them.
3.3 Case 3. Decrease in ¿
The liquidity degree of the asset is de¯ned by ¿;where a higher ¿ means a
lower liquidity degree. For example, if a government bond is 100 % liquid,
¿ = 0, an investor gets its face value when he sells the government bond
in the market. On the other hand, if a house has ¿ bigger than zero, then,
the price of the house will su®er a discount. The above price refers to the
liquidation price, in other words, when the asset is sold immediately.
The paper analyzes two di®erent issues concerning the parameter ¿:
a) Secondary market. ¿ can be interpreted as an indication of the
secondary market trading cost. For example, if banks can create a new
security with its assets, where this new security has a higher liquidity degree
than the aggregate liquidity when assets are sold separately11, then, the
11An empirical example of this situation is to transform a real estate loans in a mortgage.
15liquidation price of this new security will be higher than the price received
when each asset is sold separately. Formally, this procedure of security
design could be introduced as an asset with a lower ¿: Then, a reduction in
¿ could be interpreted as a more e±cient secondary market.
b) Implicit subsidy. Let the liquidity parameter faced by the banking
system be ´,w h e r e´ = ¿ ¡ s,w h e r es is an indication of the government
subsidy. In this setting, the extreme values of s are given by: s =0w h e n
the banking system does not have any subsidy, and s = ¿ when the banking
system has the highest subsidy.
Banks will consider ´ as the private asset liquidity degree instead of its
social liquidity degree ¿:In the special case that s = ¿, bank would consider
all its assets as being totally liquid. Let me postpone the analysis of this
government policy to the next section.
Continuing with the derivation of the comparative statics, a change in ¿
does not a®ect ®; d; and z.U s i n gt h er e l a t i o n( ® ¡ 1)d + z = w, w will be
constant.
Although w does not change, equation (17), P(w)= 1
1+¿e¿w; shows that
the liquidation price decreases due to the increment in ¿.
The change in P(w) a®ects the premium paid by banks, which according
to equation (8), J(w)=[
1¡P(w)
P(w) ]wq,i n c r e a s e s .
The e®ect of the change in the asset liquidity degree on the interest rate
can be calculated from the derivatives of (14) and (15) with respect to ¿.
As shown in the appendix, not only the loan and the deposit interest rate
increase, so does the spread.
Returning to case (a) "secondary markets ", as mentioned above, a
smaller ¿ (asset is more liquid) implies a higher asset liquidation price.
Then, any mechanism that reduces ¿ could be interpreted as a reduction of
trading costs. As a consequence, there would be a reduction in the deposit
and loan interest rates, and in the spread between them. There are several
ways to improve the secondary market e±ciency. An example could be the
creation of a mortgages market in emerging markets.
Table 2 shows, for the United States, the capital loss su®ered by banks
when their assets were sold immediately. The di®erence between the liquida-
tion cost for real estate and mortgages can be interpreted as an improvement
of the liquidation price generated by the formalization of the real estate sec-
ondary market.
Latin-American countries do not have this type of market as advanced
as developed countries. According to the model, if the mortgage market is
created not only the loan and the deposit interest rate, but also the spread
16between them, should decrease.
3.4 Case 4- Increase in ®
® is de¯ned as the percentage of deposits that depositors withdraw in the
event of a bank run. Thus, an increase in ® indicates a stronger bank run.
Given (®¡1)d+z = w, an increase in ® means an increase of w; because d
and z are constant.
Then, the liquidation price should decrease because the amount of assets
that banks sell increases. This result can be seen deriving the liquidation





(1 + ¿e¿w)2 < 0
In addition, the premium, J(w)=
1¡P(w)
P(w) wq, increases because the liq-
uidation price decreases and w increases. This result can be seen formally




The e®ect ® on the interest rate can be determined by taking the deriva-






















Therefore, according to the model, if the economy faces the possibility
of a stronger bank run, the loan interest rate and the spread will go up. On
the other hand, the model is not conclusive in regard to the deposit interest
rate.
174 Government Bail Out
This section analyzes three aspects of an anticipated government bail out:
i) the welfare e®ect, ii) the optimal bank's asset mismatch, iii) the lender of
last resort, and iv) the e®ect of an imposed reserve requirement.
4.1 Welfare analysis of an implicit government subsidy
4.1.1 Setting up the problem
To study the welfare e®ect, the paper endogenizes the determination of
loans and deposits. Formally, the paper introduces ad-hoc deposit supply
and loan demand. The introduction of ad-hoc functions is for the sake of
simplicity, otherwise, the model should formalize the production and con-
sumption problem. The bank faces an upward sloping supply for deposit
and a downward sloping demand for loans.
To determine the equilibrium in the loan market, let me assume the
following ad-hoc loan demand
iL = c ¡ vz (18)
where c>0a n dv>0. The loan supply comes from the bank's FOC.
Loan supply is,
iL = i + ¿qe¿w (19)
Note that w =( ®¡1)d+z. Then, equation (19) is not a supply function,
because that should include only z and prices, and this equation depends
also on d, which is endogenous. Therefore, it is not possible to ¯nd the
equilibrium of z and iL using solely equations (18) and (19). The equilibrium
determination in the deposit market would have the same inconvenience.
One way to ¯nd the equilibrium in both markets is solving a system that
includes these two markets together. This new system has two equations
and two unknowns.
To complete the equations of the system, it is necessary to include the
ad-hoc supply function for deposits
id = k + hd (20)
where k>0a n dh>0
Remember that the other bank's FOC is
18id =( 1¡ ±)i ¡ ¿q(® ¡ 1)e¿w (21)
The ¯rst equation of the system comes from the deposit market equilib-
rium condition, when equation (20) is equal to equation (21),
(1 ¡ ±)i ¡ ¿q(® ¡ 1)e¿w = k + hd (22)
The other equation of the system is derived from the loan market equi-
librium condition, when equation (18) is equal to equation (19)
¿qe¿w = c ¡ vz ¡ i (23)
Using equations (22) and (23n), the equilibrium relation between z and
d can be found
d = Á + ¸z (24)
Where Á =[ ( ® ¡ ±)i ¡ c(® ¡ 1) ¡ k]=h
¸ =[ v(® ¡ 1)]=h
Now, plugging (24) in (19), the optimal amount of z and iL can be
determined
i + ¿qef¿[(®¡1)Á+[(®¡1)¸+1]z]g = c ¡ vz (25)
Note that equation (25) has a unique equilibrium. The reason of this
uniqueness is that the ¯rst term of equation (25) is increasing with respect
to z and the second term is decreasing with respect z.
In the same way, the equilibrium in the deposit market is derived. De¯n-
ing ' = ¡Á=¸ and ¯ =1 =¸, the relation (24) between d and z can be rewrite
as
z = ' + ¯d (26)
Plugging (26) in (22), the optimal amount of deposits and id can be
found using the following equation,
(1 ¡ ±)i ¡ ¿q(® ¡ 1)expf¿[[(® ¡ 1) + ¯]d + ']g = k + hd (27)
Before introducing the government bail out policy, it would be convenient
to show the comparative statics of the liquidity parameter ¿.I n t h e l o a n
market, this e®ect can be shown using equation (25). The partial derivative
of the ¯rst part of the equation (25) with respect to ¿ shows a reduction of




= qe¿w(1 + ª¿) > 0
W h e r eª=( ® ¡ 1)Á +[ ( ® ¡ 1)¸ +1 ] z
This e®ect can be seen in graph (2), where a decrease in ¿,f r o m¿1 to
¿0, (so the asset is more liquid) would increase the optimal amount of z and
decrease iL.
On the other hand, concerning the deposit market, the e®ect can be
analyzed deriving the ¯rst part of equation (27) with respect to ¿.
@id
@¿
= ¡q(® ¡ 1)e¿w(1 + ¹¿) > 0( 2 8 )
Where ¹ =[ ( ® ¡ 1) + ¯d]+'
Graph 3 presents the static comparative of a change in ¿.A c c o r d i n gt o
this graph, a decrease of ¿; from ¿1 to ¿0, reduces the amount of deposits.
Concluding from graphs (2) and (3), a reduction of ¿ ( a ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
asset's liquidity degree) would result in an increase in the amount of loans
a n dar e d u c t i o ni nt h ea m o u n to fd e p o s i t .
Now, the next step is to show the formalization of a government bail
out policy and how the social cost can be measured. This bail out policy is
when the government pays for part of the asset liquidity degree. In other
words, the asset price received by banks is higher than its social price. In
the context of the model, this policy is represented through the liquidity
parameter. De¯ning the private asset liquidity degree faced by banks as
´ = ¿ ¡ s,w h e r es indicates the government subsidy. In this setting, if s is
bigger than zero, banks will consider in its maximization problem the asset
liquidity degree as more liquid than its true or "social " liquidity degree. As
a result, banks would consider in its demand for assets a liquidation price
determined by the formula, P(w;´)= 1
1+´e´w.
4.1.2 How can the social cost of the mismatch be measured?
The social cost is measured using supply and demand functions. The in-
convenience to measure the social cost, so far, is that the deposit and loan
market do not present a supply and demand equation as required to calcu-
late a social cost. A solution could be measuring the social cost using the
created variable w. The procedure to estimate this cost would consist in,
20¯rst, estimating the market equilibrium of w without distortion in the econ-
omy. And second, taking into account this equilibrium as a benchmark, a
government bail out policy is introduced by de¯ning P(w;´)= 1
1+´e´w with
s>0.
The supply function for w is deriving using the system of equations
presented before. But this time, the liquidation price would not be replaced
in its formula. Thus, the system of equation is,
Loan market i + q[
1 ¡ p(w)
p(w)
]=c ¡ vz (29)
Deposit market (1 ¡ ±)i ¡ q(® ¡ 1)[
1 ¡ p(w)
p(w)
]=k + hd (30)
>From this equation system, the supply function for w can be found by
solving (29) for z, and (30) for d. So, using the equation w =( ® ¡ 1)d + z,







(1 ¡ ±)i ¡ q(® ¡ 1)[
1¡p(w)
p(w) ] ¡ k
h
(31)








hp(w)2 > 0( 3 2 )
As mentioned above, the demand for w comes from the collection agen-
cies, which is equation (17). The optimal w and P(w) are determined where
supply is equal to demand. This equilibrium is represented by b in graph 4.
Next, the paper introduces the government bail out policy. This govern-
ment policy, as any other subsidy, generates a gap between the social price
and private price for asset liquidation. This policy means that the liquid-
ity price faces by banks, P(w;´), is higher than the social liquidity price,
P(w;¿), in other words, P(w;´)= 1
1+´e´w >P(w;¿)= 1
1+¿e¿w when ´<¿ .
The new equilibrium with the implicit subsidy would be at w1 and the
liquidation price received by banks would be P(w1). Given that the social
price is P(w2), the social cost is the area abc. Note that this cost is indepen-
dent to the existence of a bank run. This cost is generated by a misallocation
of resources every period.
214.2 How does the implicit subsidy a®ect the asset mismatch?






Thus, a lower · is interpreted as a bigger mismatch because the gap be-
tween liquid assets and liquid liabilities increases. Using the bank's balance





Now, before introducing the government bail out policy, equation (34)
determines the optimal mismatch once the equilibrium values of z and d
are plugged. On the other hands, a government bail out policy, as was shown
above, increases z and decreases d; these new values of z and d generate a
reduction of ratio, which means a higher mismatch between liquid assets
and liabilities.
This result illustrates a di®erence between the model presented in this
paper and the model proposed by Diamond and Dybvig. According to Di-
amond and Dybvig, any policy that can stop the bank run would increase
the economy's wealth. This result is explained by the fact that banks could
invest their resources in less liquid assets whose return is higher.
The model in this paper shows that an optimal mismatch exists. To
reach the asset diversi¯cation proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (all money
invested in the higher return less-liquid asset) the government would have to
pay for the liquidity risk. In other words, the Central Bank should subsidy
the liquidity risk taken by banks. The source of the di®erence of these two
models is how uncertainty is generated. While the uncertainty in Diamond
and Dybvig is represented by a change in expectation, in this paper the
uncertainty has a well-de¯ned distribution.
In addition, this section makes a contribution to the endless discussion
between narrow banking and free banking. The result of this model shows
an optimal mismatch between assets and liabilities. This result implies that
narrow banking is too restricted, because this market structure does not
allow the banking system to get as much risk as it wants. On the other
hand, if there exist an explicit or an implicit government bail out policy, a
free banking system implies an over-expansion of the banking system.
224.3 Lender of Last Resort
This sub-section discuses, on the one hand, the optimal intervention of a
lender of last resort, and on the other, how introducing the assumption made
by D&D (net worth equal to zero and probability of bank run equal to zero)
increase the vulnerability of the bank system. Note that the last conclusion,
does depend neither on the existence of moral hazard nor the value of the
net worth, this result is based on how the uncertainty is introduced.
In contrast to the D&D model, where the uncertainty is due to a change
in the depositor's expectation on the bank's health, this paper supposes
a pre-determined distribution for the uncertainty. The following example
helps to clarify the way the uncertainty is modeled. Suppose a bank in
a small open economy receives a deposit of one dollar. At the time the
bank invests the money received, it knows that there is a probability q the
US Federal Reserve will raise the interest rate. This increase in the US
i n t e r e s tr a t ew o u l dg e n e r a t eab a n kr u ni nt h es m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y ,b e c a u s e
depositors would want to invest their portfolio in the US ¯nancial market.
To introduce the lender of last resort, the model assumes that in case
of bank run a government agency will provide as much liquidity as banks
need, but charging a punitive interest rate. Recalling that the bank is risk
neutral, the pro¯t function is
¼ =( il ¡ i)z +( i ¡ id)d ¡ ih +(i ¡ ip)q(®d ¡ ±d¡ b)( 3 5 )
Where ip is the interest rate charged by the liquidity provider.12
Using the bank's balance sheet equivalence, the pro¯t function can be
written as,
¼ =( il ¡ i)z +( i ¡ id)d ¡ ih +( i ¡ ip)q[(® ¡ 1)d + z]( 3 6 )
The ¯rst order condition are
@¼
@z
=( il ¡ i)+q(i ¡ ip)( 3 7 )
@¼
@d
=( i ¡ id) ¡ i± +( i ¡ ip)q(® ¡ 1) (38)
And the spread is
il ¡ id = i± +( ip ¡ i)®q (39)
12Having more liquidity than needed to ¯nance the bank run is pareto dominated, so,
®d ¡ ±d¡ b º 0.
23If the liquidity provider charges the interest rate ip = i+
1¡p
p ,t h eF O C s
of the benchmark case, equations (14) and (15) are recovered. In other
words, the ¯rst best proposed in section 2 is achieved.
On the other hand, if ip <i+
1¡p
p , the loan supply would be higher than
the social optimal loan supply, and the deposit demand would be lower than
the social optimal deposit demand. The liquidity position of the banking
system would decrease. In other words, the vulnerability of the banking
system increases.
An interesting question concerns its applicability. First, the Central
Bank has to signal and private banks has to believe that the Central Bank
will charge an interest rate of ip = i +
1¡p
p in case of a bank run. And
second, the Central Bank has to calculate the value of P, ®,a n dq.G i v e n
t h ei n c e n t i v es t r u c t u r eo ft h eC e n t r a lB a n k ,t h e r ei sal o wp r o b a b i l i t yo f
reaching the above result. Another possibility could be that the private
sector is willing to do this type of contract. The following example shows
that the private sector is willing to assume this type of risk.
As an empirical example, the Central Bank of Argentina implemented
a combination between the lender of last resort and the liquidity insurance
scheme presented in this paper. The Central Bank of Argentina charges a
monthly premium to each bank for a liquidity insurance that the Central
Bank has acquired in the international market. In case of a bank run, the
international banks will make a repo transaction at the interest rate of i.
Therefore, the Argentina case can be interpreted as follows. During tranquil
periods, the Argentina Central Bank pays something that represents
1¡p
p and
during the crisis it pays the di®erence i. Then, in expected value, the interest
rate scheme paid by the Argentina banking system looks like ip = i +
1¡p
p ;
which is the benchmark case.
A fact to emphasize from the Argentina experience is that the private
sector provides the contingent credit line, where sometimes it is believed
that only international organization can o®er this type of contract.
As mentioned above if ip <i +
1¡p
p ; the banking system would be
more vulnerable, because its liquidity position decreases. Therefore, if any
institution o®ers a contingent credit line at the interest rate lower than
ip = i+
1¡p
p , according to this result, this institution would increase instead
of decreasing the ¯nancial system fragility.
The next step is to study the e®ect of introducing the D&D's assumptions
concerning the uncertainty. The incorporation of this assumption of zero
probability of bank run (q = 0), would transform the ¯rst order conditions
to:
24il = i (40)
id = i(1 ¡ ±)( 4 1 )
The loan supply would be even higher and the deposit demand even
lower, so the liquidity position of the ¯nancial institutions will be worse.
Remember that the uncertainty assumed is that the US Federal Reserve
could increase the interest rate with probability q. When the Federal Reserve
actually increases the interest rate, this banking system will su®er a bank
run and given that banks do not have net worth, they will go bankruptcy13.
It is worth to empathize that the ¯nancial system instability comes from
the way uncertainty is modeled and it does not depend on a Moral Hazard
problem.
4.4 Reserve Requirement
Central banks sometimes use the reserve requirement as a device to manage
the liquidity risk of the banking system. This policy consist in increasing the
reserve requirement during good times and decreasing it during bad times.
On the other hand, liquidity risk is not the only justi¯cation for using the
reserve requirement as a policy tool. Edwards and Vegh (1996) show that
under certain conditions the reserve requirement can be used to counteract
some shocks.
The main idea of this section is to analyze if the central bank can use
a reserve requirement policy to eliminate the government bail out policy.
Given a mathematical complication to get a closed form solution to study
this policy, the paper proceeds by doing some numerical simulations.
The paper focus on two cases: a) government bonds do not su®er a
capital loss when they are sold immediately, and b) government bonds su®er
a capital loss.
4.4.1 a) Case Pb =1
First, it is assumed that Pb =1( Pb is the price of a government bonds when
banks sell it immediately). In this case, government bonds do not have a
capital loss. At least for Latin-American countries, this assumption would
not be the representative case.
13Calvo (1993) mentioned that the °uctuation of the U.S. interest rate is a main factor
for capital °ows in emerging markets.
25To set up the model, equation (25) is used, but the second term of
t h ee q u a t i o ni sr e p l a c e dw i t ha nu n s p e c i ¯ e dl o a nd e m a n d . T h ef o l l o w i n g
equality shows the equilibrium in the loan market.
i + ¿qexpf¿[(® ¡ 1)Á +[ ( ® ¡ 1)¸ +1 ] z]g = f(z;c)( 4 2 )
The derivatives of the ¯rst term of equation (42) with respect to ± shows
the e®ect of the change in reserve requirement on loans supply.
@iL
@±
= q¿2e¿Ã(® ¡ 1)(
¡i
h
) > 0( 4 3 )
Where
Ã =( ® ¡ 1)Á +[ ( ® ¡ 1)¸ +1 ] z
So, due to an increase in the reserve requirement from ±0 to ±1,t h e
amount of loan decreases from z0 to z1. This exercise is represented in
graph 5.
Using the same procedure, the solution for the deposit market can be
found, where the equilibrium equation is determined by
(1 ¡ ±)i ¡ ¿q(® ¡ 1)expf¿[[(® ¡ 1) + ¯]d + ']g = f(d;k)( 4 4 )
To see how the reserve requirement (±) a®ects the equilibrium of deposits,






< 0( 4 5 )
Here, an increase in the reserve requirement from ±0 to ±1 decreases the
amount of deposits to d1. This result is represented in graph 6.
Note that using only graph 5 and 6, is not possible to estimate the e®ect
of a change in the reserve requirement on w. Remember that the goal of
using a reserve requirement as a policy instrument is to reduce w,b e c a u s e
a government bail out policy increased w.
Using a simulation method, the e®ect of the reserve requirement on the
economic variables can be observed.
Graph 7 summarizes the results of this simulation. As it is expected, the
amount of deposit and loan decrease, the interest rate spread increases, and
the amount of assets that banks need to sell in case of bank run decreases.
The ad-hoc loan demand and deposit supply used for the simulation are:
Loan Demand iL = c + vz
Deposit Supply id = j + hd
264.4.2 b) Case Pb < 1
A fall in the government bond liquidation price is the regular case observed
in Latin-America during banking panics, specially when all banks try to sell
their bond holding in the market.
In this case, the amount of resources that banks have to collect selling
their assets is,
®d ¡ ±d¡ Pbb = w0 (46)
Note that Pb will be between 0 and 1, when Pb is equal to 1 banks can
recover the bond at its face value.
Adding and subtracting z and b to equation (46), the above formula can
be rewritten as
[(® ¡ ±)+Pb(± ¡ 1)]d + zPb = w0 (47)
In this case the insurance premium is

















Further, the paper assumes that the bond price follows the relation
Pb = e¡¿bb (50)
where ¿b is the liquidity degree of government bonds.14
Then, after plugging (48), (49) and (50) in the bank's ¯rst order con-
dition and assuming speci¯c deposit supply and loan demand, the model is
ready for a new simulations of an increase in the reserve requirement.
Graph 8 shows the result for this second simulation. Note that the
only di®erence would be the amount of resources that banks need to avoid
bankruptcy, where this number increase instead of decrease.
14A supply and demand for bond could be speci¯ed in the same way as it was for the
assets sold by banks (w), to get the equilibrium price Pb = e
¡¿bb:
27The speci¯c loan demand and deposit supply used are:
Loan Demand iL = c + 1
z2
Deposit Supply id = j + d1:3
As conclusion, is not clear that a reserve requirement policy would always
eliminate the externality generated by the government. On the other hand,
an insurance scheme would eliminate the government externality, because
the premium could compensate exactly the government subsidy.
285 Conclusion
The paper shows an alternative solution to the moral hazard problem gener-
ated by an expected government bail out the ¯nancial system. This solution
is an insurance scheme that depends on the risk faced by banks. As an
e x a m p l e ,t h em o d e lp r e s e n t st h ec a s ew h e r et h e¯ n a n c i a ls y s t e mf a c e so n l y
liquidity risk. In this case, the policy recommendation is that the Central
Bank should charge a premium to each bank depending on its liquidity po-
sition. An example of this type of scheme is found in Argentina, where the
Central Bank charges a premium to each bank for liquidity insurance that
it acquires in the international market.
Before introducing the government bail out policy, the paper analyzes the
e®ect on the economy of shocks such as: i) Capital in°ow, ii) Development
of secondary markets, iii) Increases in the probability of a bank run, and iv)
Increases in the power of the run.
Once the government bail out policy is introduced, the model shows how
this policy can i) reduce the lending interest rate, ii) reduce deposit interest
rates, and iii) reduce the spread between them.
Further, the paper derives a new procedure to estimate the social cost of
the externality generated by the government bail out policy. This social cost
is di®erent from what is considered so far as cost, which is the transfer from
the government to the ¯nancial sector, and is independent of the occurrence
of a crisis.
Finally, the model predicts an increase in the fragility of the ¯nancial
system due to the government bail out policy. This is measured by the
ratio between liquid assets and liquid liabilities, where the lower the ratio,
the higher the fragility. An interesting extension of the fragility variable is
its link with the discussion between narrow and free banking. The model
shows that before introducing the government bail out policy, there is an
optimum mismatch. In other words, in equilibrium, there is an optimum
amount of assets that, in case of an unexpected withdrawal, banks should
sell at a discount. Once the government bail out policy is introduced, the
model predicts that the mismatch, as well as the social cost, increase.
296 Appendix
In the appendix, we develop the equations used in the static comparative
section.
The cost function assumed was C(w)=e¿w ¡ 1, for all w>0a n d¿>0.
Remember from (10) that w =( ® ¡ 1)d + z
>From the collection ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem we get
P(w)= 1
1+C0(w) (19)




Moreover, plugging equation (43) in the premium function we have,
J = q¿exp(¿w)[(® ¡ 1)d + z]( 5 2 )
To facilitate the reading, we order the partial derivatives in the following
order: First, we will show the partial derivatives that solve the ¯rst order
condition of the bank. Second, we will derive the needed partial derivative
for each endogenous variable.
1- Partial derivatives for the bank ¯rst order condition.
@J(w)
@d
= ¿e¿wq(® ¡ 1) < 0( 5 3 )
@J(w)
@z
= ¿e¿wq>0( 5 4 )
2- Groups of derivatives for each endogenous variable.
a) Derivatives for the insurance premium
@J2
@d2 = ¿2e¿wq(® ¡ 1)2 > 0
@J2
@d@z
= ¿2e¿wq(® ¡ 1) < 0
@J2
@z2 = ¿2e¿wq>0
With respect to ¿
30@J2
@d@¿
= e¿wq(® ¡ 1)[1 + ¿w] < 0
@J2
@z@¿
= e¿wq[1 + ¿w] > 0
With respect to ®
@J2
@d@®




With respect to q
@J2
@d@q
= ¿e¿w(® ¡ 1) < 0
@J2
@z@q
= ¿e¿w > 0
b) Spread
T h es p r e a di sd e ¯ n e da siL ¡ id,






Replacing for (45) and (46) we should get
`




= ¿2qe¿w(® ¡ 1)®<0
@(iL ¡ id)
@z
= ¿2®qe¿w > 0
@(iL ¡ id)
@¿
= ®qe¿w[1 + ¿w] > 0
@(iL ¡ id)
@®
= ¿®qe¿w[1 + ¿®d] > 0
@(iL ¡ id)
@q
= ¿®e¿w > 0
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